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10 The tendency to consider the Behavioral Law and
11 Economics and Cognitive Law and Economics as
12 different sides of the same coin has been wide-
13 spread inside the discipline. That was the conse-
14 quence of a miscomprehension of what behavioral
15 economics and cognitive economics are. These
16 two research areas arise from a shared critique to
17 standard neoclassical economics assumption of
18 agents’ perfect rationality and a common idea
19 that economic agents, in the real world, are hetero-
20 geneous and more cognitive complex than what
21 the theory assumed, but soon they diverge pursu-
22 ing different goals and partially applying different
23 research tools. Particularly BL&E is more con-
24 cerned with what agents do, while CL&E is more
25 about how agents think.
26 Hence we need a proper discussion of what
27 Cognitive Law and Economics is as well as we
28 need a proper definition of Behavioral Law and
29 Economics.
30Introduction
31Do we really need an autonomous definition for
32Cognitive Law and Economics or it is the same of
33Behavioral Law and Economics? The tendency to
34consider the two approaches as different sides of
35the same coin has been widespread inside the
36discipline. That was the consequence of a mis-
37comprehension of what behavioral economics and
38cognitive economics are. These two research areas
39arise from a shared critique to standard neoclassi-
40cal economics assumption of agents’ perfect ratio-
41nality and a common idea that economic agents, in
42the real world, are heterogeneous and more cog-
43nitive complex than what the theory assumed, but
44soon they diverge pursuing different goals and
45partially applying different research tools. Hence
46we need a proper discussion of what Cognitive
47Law and Economics is as well as we need a proper
48definition of Behavioral Law and Economics.
49Other entries in this encyclopedia show how
50and when law meets economics (see Law and
51Economics or Behavioral Law and Economics or
52Nudge or Financial Education). When law schol-
53ars started applying the insights offered by neo-
54classical economics to their inquiry, the aim of this
55new approach to law was to develop both a pos-
56itive and a normative theory of law on which to
57build efficient legal norms. Law and economics
58(L&E) uses economic models and econometric
59tools to develop its research in two ways:
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60 1. Pursuing efficiency: efficiency is considered
61 from two different points of view; on the one
62 hand, it means that common law (judge-made
63 law) is efficient, and on the other, from a nor-
64 mative point of view, it also means that law
65 must be efficient.
66 2. Its emphasis on incentives and people’s res-
67 ponses to those incentives.
68 L&E has been widely criticized (Ellickson
69 1989) in that applying economic tools is not suf-
70 ficient to investigate the logic underlying the law
71 and that the reductionist approach of economics
72 cannot enable L&E to develop a proper positive
73 theory of law and it excludes any consideration
74 about justice.
75 L&E has been strongly influenced by the
76 changes and debates that have characterized the
77 development of economics since the middle of the
78 last century (Rachlinski 2000). In recent years, the
79 results obtained by the behavioral economics have
80 given new emphasis to the first criticisms brought
81 against law and economics. Behavioral econom-
82 ics shows that human behavior deviates from the
83 perfect rationality assumption, and these devia-
84 tions are not completely random, so it is possible
85 to model and predict human behavior when it is
86 affected by biases. During the 1990s, Jolls et al.
87 (1998) investigate the opportunities offered by
88 behavioral economics to develop a new approach
89 to law based on a more exhaustive theory of
90 human behavior whereby better understanding
91 of the foundations of individual behavior should
92 strengthen both the descriptive power of models
93 and their normative power. Their pioneering work
94 gives rise to Behavioral Law and Economics
95 (BL&E). During these same years, inside eco-
96 nomics is developing another important research
97 approach called cognitive economics (CI) (Bourgine
98 and Nadal 2004). Cognitive economics shares
99 with the behavioral approach the idea that
100 human behavior is complex and that economic
101 theory must ground its theories on a better under-
102 standing of cognitive decision-making processes.
103 Cognitive economics retrieve the tradition of what
104 Sent (2004) define “Old Behavioral Economics”
105 that is the approach by Herbert Simon, instead that
106 Kahneman’s.
107Nevertheless, the two approaches follow (almost
108partially) different paths of inquiry. Cognitive
109economics puts itself in opposition to neoclassical
110economics investigating economic problems as
111complex phenomena. Its inquiry focuses on the
112analysis of the micro-foundations of human
113behavior and applies an interdisciplinary approach.
114Cognitive economics strongly criticizes the as-
115sumptions of standard economics and focus on
116the complexity of decision-making processes of
117heterogeneous agents. It questions the predictions
118of standard economics models and the rigidity of
119the formal tools applied. It is aimed at understand-
120ing decision-making processes, but it differs from
121behavioral economics, whosemethodology is based
122on the analysis of the effectively exhibited behav-
123iors. Cognitive economics’ central idea is that
124each phenomenon can be investigated with differ-
125ent tools and from different points of view. For
126example, cognitive economics investigates inter-
127dependent decisions using game theory not as a
128formal tool to predict specific outcomes but as a
129framework of analysis that allows investigating
130the complexity of agents’ decision-making pro-
131cesses (Schelling 1960); the outcomes of the game
132do not simply depend on strategies, but they are
133strongly linked to social context, path dependence
134dynamics, and focal pints. Cognitive economics
135focus on norms and institutions (Rizzello and
136Turvani 2000, 2002), but while law and econom-
137ics has been much influenced by behavioral eco-
138nomics, the cognitive analysis of institutions has
139not been considered until recently.
140Ambrosino (2016) shows two main explana-
141tions for this lack of interest in the cognitive
142theory of institutions:
1431. The different concept of norms underlying the
144two research fields.
1452. The cognitive theory of institutions is still far
146from developing a normative theory, and it
147focuses its inquiry on the positive level.
148Nevertheless in the last few years, part of the
149literature points out the relevance of the analysis
150of the role of institutional forces and social norms
151in constraining and coordinating heterogeneous
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152 individuals, and cognitive economics and law and
153 economics start to be connected and a new path of
154 inquiry is arising.
155 The next sections are organized as follow: sec-
156 tion “Why Behavioral Law and Economics is not
157 Cognitive Law and Economics” explains why
158 Cognitive Law and Economics (CL&E) is not
159 the same as BL&E, particularly, “Toward a Cog-
160 nitive Approach to Law and Economics” des-
161 cribes the main feature of CL&E, and “Main
162 Critiques to Behavioral Law and Economics”
163 focuses on the main critiques that such approach
164 moves to behavioral law and economics. Section
165 “Toward a Cognitive Law and Economics
166 Inquiry” provides an example of how CL&E con-
167 tributes to the inquiry into law.
168 Why Behavioral Law and Economics is
169 not Cognitive Law and Economics
170 Toward a Cognitive Approach to Law and
171 Economics
172 The cognitive theory of institutions is grounded
173 on the idea that it is not possible to investigate the
174 rise and evolution of institutions without investi-
175 gating individual decision-making processes
176 (North 2005). The institutional and the individual
177 levels of analysis are interconnected, so that an
178 institutional change may be the starting point for
179 modification of agents’ behavior, and new cogni-
180 tive classifications or new routines of behavior
181 can engender a slow process of institutional
182 change (Hayek 1982; Hodgson 2004; Ambrosino
183 2014). Cognitive theory of institutions assumes
184 that agents are heterogeneous. Heterogeneity
185 means that agents can exhibit different behaviors
186 even if they belong to the same social and cultural
187 context. That heterogeneity doesn’t prevent coor-
188 dination because agents are different, but they are
189 made up of the same ingredients (Hayek 1982).
190 Hence, they are able to understand each other, to
191 build correct expectations about each other’s
192 behavior, and to share common social norms.
193 Recently such research filed shows points of
194 contact with that part of the legal theory that
195 firmly critiques BL&E. Such connection opens
196 the door to a proper cognitive approach to L&E.
197Particularly, Gregory Mitchell’s main works
198seems to represent the main contribution to devel-
199oping inquiry into the “individual-institution”
200framework already described by the cognitive
201theory of institutions (Hodgson 2004; Ambrosino
2022014). Mitchell’s critique of BL&E “provides
203reasons why legal theory should refrain from
204broad statements about the manner in which all
205legal actors process information, make judgments
206and reach decisions and why others should be
207skeptical of such broad claims by the legal deci-
208sion theorists” (2002b, p. 33); “legal decision
209theorists should recognize the need for greater
210caution and precision in drawing of descriptive
211and prescriptive conclusions from empirical research
212on judgment and decision making” (2002b p. 32).
213Mitchell’s contribution is based on a strong belief
214in the utility of psychological and other empirical
215research for legal analysis.
216It emerges a new approach to law that shares
217with cognitive institutional economics the idea
218that agents are heterogeneous and that simply
219introducing the existence of “standard” biases in
220modeling human behavior does not enable the
221development of efficient predictive models; the
222perfect rationality assumption is not an appropri-
223ate instrument with which to investigate agents’
224behavior, and a proper theory of human behavior
225is needed. This approach suggests that the exis-
226tence of cognitive biases in legal contexts must be
227investigated in the field and with respect to spe-
228cific contexts through “social facts studies”
229(Mitchell et al. 2011): a social facts study applies
230different research methods to explain case-
231specific descriptive or causal claims, and it is
232focused on the context-specific features of the
233case at hand. The analysis of how agents should
234behave cannot be separated from the investigation
235of the specific social context and cultural and
236social relations. A multidisciplinary approach is
237necessary to develop better inquiry into the com-
238plexity of decision-making processes in legal con-
239texts. Legal theory, hence, moves toward a new
240approach, in which the cognitive determinants of
241agents’ behavior are investigated; it highlights the
242importance of (i) agents’ cognitive predisposi-
243tions, (ii) learning processes and the influence of
244past experience, and (iii) the role of context.
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245 Moreover a cognitive inquiry into the diffusion of
246 normative behavior and institutional change can
247 furnish key into the opportunities offered by the
248 development of prescriptive rules in shaping indi-
249 vidual behavior. It emerges a new metacognitive
250 approach to legal theory in which norms are con-
251 crete instruments with which to induce agents to
252 develop different ways of processing information.
253 CL&E, following a social facts analysis, shows
254 how to build appropriate decision tools based on
255 objective casual claims. Scientific research results
256 can be applied to normative purposes. They
257 should constitute a sort of “social authority”: an
258 organizing principle for courts’ of legislator’ use
259 of social science to create or modify a rule of law
260 (Monahan et al. 2009). In the perspective of
261 CL&E, social research and legal theory partially
262 lose the need to furnish normative models. Pro-
263 ducing case-specific evidence through reliable
264 social science principles and methods, they be-
265 come the research instruments that give judges
266 and courts, and more generally the legislator, the
267 information and the tools with which to evaluate
268 and create new rules of law.
269 Main Critiques to Behavioral Law and
270 Economics
271 Part of the literature inside legal theory criticizes
272 BL&E both under a theoretical and a methodo-
273 logical point of view and points out relevant ele-
274 ments of contact with cognitive economics that
275 has opened the door to a new path of inquiry.
276 BL&E arise to pursue two main aims: first,
277 explain why people do not act as they should in
278 context of interest for legal theory (the benchmark
279 being that agents should behave as the perfect
280 rationality assumption expects), and second, bring
281 people to act as they should proposing “a form of
282 paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that should be
283 acceptable to those who are firmly committed to
284 freedom of choice on grounds of either autonomy
285 or welfare” (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1160).
286 To pursue such aims, BL&E applies the tools
287 and the insights furnished by behavioral eco-
288 nomics. It is not surprising that BL&E today is
289 exposed to quite the same critiques as behavioral
290 economics (Ambrosino 2016).
291The first critique to BL&E is strictly related to
292one of the cornerstone ideas inside B&E. It is a
293common opinion in B&E that it is possible to
294incorporate the complexity of the cognitive deter-
295minants of human behavior into the standard for-
296mal models of the neoclassical approach. The idea
297is that the assumption of perfect rationality can be
298replaced with a new concept of rationality – in
299which the existence of deviations from the perfect
300rationality assumption is explained by introducing
301new variables corresponding to particular biases
302assumed as commonly shared among agents – that
303better explains the complexity of real decision-
304making processes. Behavioral economics returns
305to being a research approach completely compat-
306ible with mainstream economics (Davis 2013).
307This tendency to build formal models has also
308taken place in the behavioral approach to L&E
309(Korobkin and Ulen 2000). The replacement of
310the perfect rationality assumption guarantees that
311BL&E models, compatible with the mainstream,
312produce strong normative outcomes. The first crit-
313icism to BL&E concerns the way in which
314scholars introduce into their inquiries insights
315drawn from the cognitive and psychosocial
316research of the past 30 years (Mitchell 2002a,
3172002b, 2003 AU3). BL&E grounds its research on the
318evidence of the existence of cognitive biases in
319human behavior and argues that such biases are
320widespread in the population and are responsible
321for predictable and systematic errors (Korobkin
322and Ulen 2000). Nevertheless BL&E scholars fail
323in their attempt to criticize the perfect rationality
324assumption because they do not develop a new
325concept of rationality including the complexity
326of human decision-making processes. BL&E sub-
327stitutes the neoclassical assumption of perfect
328rationality with an assumption of “equal incom-
329petence” (Mitchell 2002a). This assumption is
330based on empirical research that shows homoge-
331neous behavioral tendencies among agents.
332BL&E uses these behavioral tendencies to com-
333pile a list of common deviations from rationality
334that characterizes the entire population, and it
335develops normative models prescribing how agents
336have to behave and how decision-makers should
337intervene to shape agents’ behavior and avoid
338their errors. B&LE overlooks the substantial
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339 empirical evidence that people are not equally
340 irrational and that human behavior is strongly
341 influenced by situational variables: “The only
342 way the lessons of behavioral decision research
343 on bounded rationality can be manageably incor-
344 porated into behavioral models for use in the law
345 is if these lessons apply widely and uniformly. If
346 the rationality of behavior depends on particular
347 characteristics of the legal actor or on even just a
348 few characteristics of the situation at hand, then
349 the development of behavioral models that are
350 both realistic and predictive becomes enormously
351 complex” (Mitchell 2002a p. 83). CL&E argues
352 that BL&E do not understand that heuristic pro-
353 cessing is only one mode of thought and that
354 agents often do not act as expected, and it suggests
355 the need for a legal theory focused on finding
356 solutions to specific problems rather than on
357 developing a general model of legal behavior.
358 HeuristicsAU4 can lead to favorable solutions; in
359 many cases they can also give rise to errors.
360 BL&E relies on the results obtained by behavioral
361 research developed in other branches of economic
362 theory and generalizes their significance. One of
363 the main contributions is the pioneering work of
364 Kahneman and Tvresky (1974). These authors
365 argue that their “studies on inductive reasoning
366 have focused on systematic errors because they
367 are diagnostic of the heuristics that generally gov-
368 ern judgment and inference” (1974, p. 313). But
369 this does not mean that the so-called K-T man can
370 be reduced simply to the use of rules of thumb and
371 heuristics in judgment. It seems an excessively
372 simple explanation of human decision-making.
373 “The likelihood that a particular decision or judg-
374 ment will deviate from the ideal behavior derived
375 from norms of rationality depends on a range of
376 personal and situational factor. Even inside the
377 relatively controlled environment of the labora-
378 tory, we see considerable variation in cognitive
379 performance among individuals depending on their
380 cognitive abilities, educational background, and
381 affective state” (Mitchell 2002a, p. 109). CL&E
382 suggests legal theory should not seek a general
383 model of judgment and decision-making, but it
384 should develop a contextualist approach that seeks
385 to identify the conditions under which irrational
386 behavior occurs. BL&E has important norma-
387 tive, methodological, and empirical limitations
388that prevent it from achieving descriptive and
389predictive accuracy. The libertarian paternalism
390suggesting that planners can improve social wel-
391fare by setting default rules that create benefits for
392those who commit errors but cause little or no
393harm to those who are fully rational (Sunstein
394and Thaler 2003) assumes the pervasiveness of
395irrational tendencies but ignores less invasive
396forms of intervention that may help agents over-
397come their errors without altering the substantive
398rights of the parties (Mitchell 2005). BL&E des-
399cribing behavior as rational or irrational requires a
400normative standard against which the behavior
401may be judged (Mitchell 2003b). The behavioral
402approach assumes that rationality requires logical
403consistency and coherence in the formation and
404ordering of beliefs and preferences (Kahneman
4051994; Simon 1997). Rationality as coherence op-
406erates as a closed system. Individual defines goals
407and beliefs and behavior must be logically consis-
408tent and coherent with respect to those goals and
409beliefs. In the case of legal judgment, when evi-
410dence of an irrational judgment is found, many
411different explanations are possible, some of which
412make the irrationality of the decision questionable
413(Mitchell 2003b). A behavior in a particular con-
414text may be at the same time rational and irrational
415depending on the goals, the interpretation of the
416situation, and the tools used by any agent involved
417in the decision-making process.
418The second main criticism concerns the meth-
419ods employed to test for cognitive biases and
420errors (Mitchell 2002b, 2003b). BL&E research
421underestimates situational and individual varia-
422tions in behavior and employs relatively weak
423tests of the hard-core assumptions of agents’ cog-
424nitive feature. The point is that the core of the
425research in heuristics and biases is based on sta-
426tistical significance tests on experimentally gener-
427ated and aggregate data. This body of research
428formulates in general terms the conditions under
429which events of various sorts occur and provides
430an interesting set of findings in general terms
431but with unspecified practical implications. Judg-
432ments are summarized by averaging across all the
433experimental subjects. That means that in BL&E
434analysis, if individual differences among judges
435emerge, these differences are treated as “errors,”
436and an “average judge” is considered the most
Cognitive Law and Economics 5
437 meaningful summary of judges. This approach
438 has the advantage of ensuring generalizability.
439 Therefore, rather than examining individual vari-
440 ation in judgment and choice, behavioral decision
441 theorists typically assume that “to a first approxi-
442 mation, the thought processes of most unin-
443 stitutionalized adults are quite similar, and any
444 variation in subjects’ responses is attributed to
445 measurement error or random variance” (Mitchell
446 2002b, p. 46). The rigor of experimental research
447 is purchased at the price of generalizability of
448 results, and this trade-off operates most directly
449 in those fields that use laboratory experiments to
450 study how humans navigate complex social envi-
451 ronments like BL&E. Such critique is strongly
452 related to the debate emerged in psychology
453 about the danger of relying on “statistical signifi-
454 cance” as a measure of behavioral tendencies.
455 Scientists (and journals) publish studies and ana-
456 lyses that “work” and place those that do not in the
457 file drawer (Rosenthal 1979). One answer to this
458 problem of publication bias is that we can trust a
459 result if it is supported by many different studies.
460 But this argument breaks down if scientists
461 exploit ambiguity in order to obtain statistically
462 significant results (Simmons et al. 2011).
463 Toward a Cognitive Law and Economics
464 Inquiry
465 Hence Cognitive Law and Economics is aimed at
466 developing a legal theory in which the peculiarity
467 of decision-making in legal contexts can be really
468 explained. The critique of the equal incompetence
469 assumption suggests the need for a new analysis
470 in which heterogeneous agents are considered
471 (Mitchell 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b).
472 Evidence on cognitive biases must be investi-
473 gated in legal contexts so as to build an original
474 and consistent map of evidence. CL&E aspires to
475 develop a contextualist approach. A contextual-
476 ized approach acknowledges that features of the
477 person, the situation, and the task have an impact
478 on the nature and quality of judgment.
479 Experiments are only one of the tools that
480 should be applied to examine variations in indi-
481 vidual behavior. The need for an interdisciplinary
482approach arises from the recognition that multiple
483forces combine to produce particular behaviors.
484The cognitive theory of institutions has yet devel-
485oped interesting inquiries into coordination pro-
486cesses (Schelling 1960) and into the relevance of
487learning in the process through which people con-
488form to social or formal rules.
489More recently, an example of the kind of in-
490quiry CL&E can develop is given by Mitchell
491(2009) idea of a metacognitive approach to regu-
492lation. Such approach is based on his discussion
493about the role of second-level thought in shaping
494human behavior. BL&E describes judgment as the
495product of a non-deliberative thought process
496based on cognitive heuristics and rules of thumb.
497Psychological models of actors developed inside
498BL&E show that biases in judgment and errors
499often arise at the level of first-order thoughts;
500thoughts occur at the direct level of cognition
501and are not intentional and not deliberative.
502These models assume that agents are incapable
503of going beyond these first-order thoughts and
504that this is the cause of irrational and discrimina-
505tory behavior. This emphasizes the role of auto-
506matic and intuitive thoughts while neglecting
507the role played by controlled and deliberative
508thoughts. It leaves no room for self-correction,
509arguing that individuals lack self-awareness of
510their biases, and it ignores the substantial evidence
511that agents learn through experience. Second
512thoughts may be the products of conscious effort,
513but they may also be automatic corrections work-
514ing at the unconscious level. The propensity to
515engage in self-correction varies among persons
516and situations, but all cognitively normal people
517are able to engage in some amount of “metacog-
518nition” about their own thoughts (Loires 1998).
519People may differ in their propensity for such
520reflection depending on their education, upbring-
521ing, values, or genetic endowment, but everyone
522possesses some level of ability in rethinking their
523own thoughts.
524Regulation should take it into consideration. If
525second thoughts apply, lawwill not simply change
526the prices of different behaviors for the purposes
527of a rational analysis of the costs and benefits of
528different courses of action. Rather, law will focus
529on altering the ways in which agent processes
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530 information. Under this point of view, law is a
531 system of second thoughts that functions both
532 consciously and unconsciously. Hence, law can
533 contribute to influencing thoughts and behaviors
534 in legal contexts. Mitchell provides concrete
535 applications of his theory of law. The author
536 (Monahan et al. 2009; Mitchell 2010; Mitchell
537 et al. 2011) enters the debate on the proper scope
538 of expert witness testimony that purports to sum-
539 marize general social science evidence to provide
540 context for the fact-finder to decide case-specific
541 questions. Mitchell’s analysis focuses on the
542 Dukes v. Wal-Mart case on gender discrimination
543 toward female employees. Dukes’ plaintiffs sub-
544 mitted expert statistical evidence showing that
545 female employees were faring worse in the aggre-
546 gate than male employees, and a report by a so-
547 cial science expert identified a common source of
548 this discrimination across all Wal-Mart facilities
549 (Mitchell 2010, p. 136). The social science expert
550 based his report on the “social framework anal-
551 ysis” method (Fiske and Borgida 1999). This
552 method consists in using social science research
553 as a framework for analyzing the facts of a partic-
554 ular case. The reliability of such analysis is based
555 on the reliability of the research on which the
556 general conclusions applied to the case at hand
557 are based. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, the expert sum-
558 marized research on gender bias, organizational
559 culture, and anti-discrimination measures and
560 applied it to interpret the facts in the discovery
561 material supporting the claims of the Dukes plain-
562 tiffs. Mitchell argues that testimony based on that
563 social framework analysis should be restrained
564 from making any linkage between general social
565 science research findings and specific case ques-
566 tions. In the specific case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
567 he based his critique on two main points: (1) in
568 social framework analysis, experts use their per-
569 sonal judgment rather than scientific method to
570 link social science to specific cases; in some sense,
571 social framework analysis make the same mistake
572 that BL&E does in extending the experimental
573 economics results to its research purposes without
574 dealingwith context-specific research. (2) The expert
575 corroborated his report with statistical evidence.
576 But the statistical evidence was itself subject
577 to dispute with regard to the proper unit of anal-
578 ysis. The plaintiffs argued for an aggregate-data
579approach. This choice did not allow consideration
580of context-specific differences due to store-by-
581store variation in male-female outcomes and to
582local control over personnel matters. This use of
583statistical evidence is an example of how statisti-
584cal results can vary depending on the many deci-
585sions that researchers have tomakewhile collecting
586and analyzing data (which outliers to exclude,
587which measures to analyze, and so on). Mitchell
588argues that there are social science techniques
589and methods that allow development of opinions
590about the parties or behaviors involved in a par-
591ticular case; such evidence has been referred to as
592“social facts” (Mitchell et al. 2011). Social facts
593are special types of adjudicative facts produced
594by applying social science techniques to case-
595specific data in order to help prove some issue in
596the case. Awide variety of social science methods
597can be used to produce social facts. The design of
598a social fact study depends on what a party hopes
599to learn. Mitchell divides the search for social
600facts according to three main goals:
6011. Obtaining descriptive information: getting the
602facts right is important, but doing so can be
603difficult when the relevant facts are in the pos-
604session of a large number of nonparties.
6052. Obtaining explanatory information: gain a bet-
606ter understanding of the issue in a case. Many
607research methods can be applied, such as inter-
608view, survey, observational study, and experi-
609mental simulation.
6103. Testing specific hypotheses: the ideal way to
611test causal hypotheses is through the use of
612experiments in which participants’ behaviors
613are recorded to assess how changes in the
614experimental conditions affect the behavior in
615question (Mitchell et al. 2011).
616Social facts constructed by a proper scientific
617method possess scientific reliability and fit the
618facts of a particular case. Such reliability depends
619on the reliability of the scientific method applied.
620Mitchell shows that when addressing such a com-
621plex task as deciding a legal dispute, it is neces-
622sary to rely on rigorous interdisciplinary research
623tools that help prove some issue in the case.
624CLE remains a very recent research project;
625its finding can be still considered a preliminary
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626 attempt to develop a proper interdisciplinary in-
627 quiry to law and economics. Moreover this ap-
628 proach is still mainly focused on a positive ground.
629 As shown in this section, CL&E is a very relevant
630 and promising research field.
631 Cross-References
632 ▶Behavioral law and economics
633 ▶Law and Economics
634 ▶Nudge
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